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Lucy Johnstone, Mary Boyle, John Cromby,  
Jacqui Dillon, Dave Harper, Peter Kinderman,  
Eleanor Longden, David Pilgrim & John Read
The project group reflects on the responses to the Power Threat Meaning Framework (PTMF) one year after 
publication. The group welcomes the interest shown in the document, and takes this opportunity to clarify some 
points, reflect on and learn from others, and suggest areas for future development.
WE ARE PLEASED to be welcoming this issue of Forum exactly a year since the launch of the Power Threat Meaning 
Framework (PTMF; Johnstone & Boyle, 2018a; 
Johnstone & Boyle, 2018b). As readers will be 
aware, it comprises a lengthy and dense set of 
documents which inevitably present complex 
arguments. The ambitious aim of the project 
was to outline a conceptual alternative to the 
diagnostic system, so this level of detail and 
complexity was unavoidable. However, we 
have offered accessible ways in via a two-page 
summary, the talks from the launch, and 
the ‘Guided Discussion’, along with inter-
views and videos (www.bps.org.uk/news-and-
policy/introducing-power-threat-meaning-
framework) and more are in the process of 
development. 
The framework is not official British Psycho-
logical Society policy, nor official policy of the 
Division of Clinical Psychology, and in offering 
it as a conceptual resource and a focus for 
discussion we had no idea what kind of recep-
tion it would get. As it has turned out, it has 
been successful in stimulating interest and 
debate beyond anything we could have hoped 
for. A dozen blogs on the PTMF appeared in 
the first fortnight, and even in the relatively 
short time since publication, there are various 
examples of translating it into practice across 
a range of different fields, as illustrated in 
this issue. There is already a Spanish version, 
with Italian and Danish translations planned, 
and the authors have received many invita-
tions to give talks across the UK and further 
afield in Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Greece, 
New Zealand and Australia.
It is worth emphasising the frame-
work’s status – unlike the dominant diag-
nostic model – as an optional perspective; 
a conceptual resource which people may 
or may not wish to engage with or begin to 
translate into practice. Confusion appears 
to have arisen in some quarters about the 
descriptions of the PTMF as an ‘alternative’. 
Clearly we are attempting to describe what an 
alternative – in  the sense of a system which 
could replace the diagnostic one – would look 
like. Whether and how it is implemented, 
as a complete ‘alternative’ in this sense, or 
perhaps more realistically in the short-term as 
an option running alongside the diagnostic 
one, or simply encouraging thinking about 
alternatives within current services, is not our 
decision but a position to be reached within 
particular settings in discussion with relevant 
stakeholders. 
The PTMF builds on many other ideas 
and existing practices (some of which are 
illustrated in Appendices 2–14 of the over-
view). The aim is to offer additional vali-
dation and support for these and other 
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examples, as well as potentially suggesting 
developments and additional ways forward. If 
its ideas take us a few steps down the road to 
more humane, evidence-based and effective 
approaches to many forms of thoughts, feel-
ings and behaviours that are currently diag-
nostically labelled, it will be because people 
(service users, professionals, policy makers 
and others) believe that it meets a need and 
want to take its ideas further.
Responses to the framework
Inevitably, and as predicted, the response has 
not all been positive, and we wish to take 
the opportunity to address some of the feed-
back and critiques, both constructive and 
less so, of what is necessarily a developing 
document. We will return to the latter 
at the end of the article. Readers may also 
like to refer to the Frequently Asked Ques-




The sentence that has arguably been seen 
as most contentious is: ‘…it can no longer be 
considered professionally, scientifically or ethi-
cally justifiable to present psychiatric diagnoses 
as if they were valid statements about people 
and their difficulties’ (Johnstone & Boyle, 
2018b, p.85). We stand by this statement about 
professional responsibility to be open about 
these debates and about the current status of 
diagnostic categories. It is the very least that is 
required in relation to a system that has been 
described by those who draw it up as neither 
‘safe or scientifically sound’. (Frances, 2014). 
This uncomfortable state of affairs may cause 
understandable confusion and uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, service users, and indeed all of 
us, have the right to know about it. 
This professional obligation does not, 
 as alleged, involve policing ordinary people’s 
language uses, since as we have also made 
clear: ‘We support individuals’ right to make 
their own choice of terminology’ (p.85). 
However, as we note, ‘At present this right 
typically works one way only: those who 
want their difficulties defined in diagnostic 
terms are unlikely to be denied this.’ Strong 
responses from those who find their diagnosis 
useful (a position which we respect) have at 
times seemed to imply a picture of people 
being routinely stripped of their labels. But 
the actual situation is as one service user 
described: ‘Service users who identify with 
their diagnosis – you have pretty much an 
entire mental health system that agrees and 
supports your perspective. Those of us who feel 
utterly hopeless and oppressed by our diag-
nosis – where do we go?’ (@bootlegboudica, 
17 September 2018.)1
More subtly dismissive are claims that 
the framework is ‘sociopolitical’ ‘extremist’ 
and ‘polemical’. We make no apology for 
producing a framework which is sociopolitical 
in the sense that it situates people’s distress 
firmly in that context and links directly to 
ideas about social justice and community and 
social action. And it does offer a critique in 
a very controversial area, which frequently 
invites the term ‘polemical’. But it is not unevi-
denced – although it does question the narrow 
definitions of ‘evidence’; the separation of fact 
and value and the assumed neutrality of much 
mainstream psychology and psychiatry.
The framework, diagnosis  
and the provisional patterns
Some comments on the framework, while 
admitting that diagnostic systems were flawed, 
implied that an alternative was not necessarily 
needed. However, psychiatric classification 
and diagnosis have not persisted over so many 
years in the face of almost continuous criti-
cism without many protective strategies, which 
are unlikely to be abandoned in the near 
future. These include claiming that diagnosis 
is necessary for communication, to develop 
and select treatment and to ‘be scientific’, but 
also include being open about some problems 
and giving an impression of tackling them. 
A particularly effective claim, widely used 
since DSM-III, is that diagnostic categories are 
‘just descriptions’. Taken together, strategies 
like these create an impression of diagnostic 
systems of one type or another as natural 
and inevitable. So natural and inevitable that 
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senior devisers of the system are able to admit 
very publicly that it has comprehensively failed 
in its own terms (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013) – only for things to carry on pretty 
much as before.
Supporters of psychiatric diagnostic systems 
have, knowingly or otherwise, been able to 
make use of this protection; for example, 
presenting official diagnostic systems as imper-
fect but improving, with some diagnostic cate-
gories more ‘successful’ or acceptable than 
others, as compatible with formulation and as 
playing an important if not essential role in the 
development of psychological understanding 
and treatment. Many of these responses have 
emerged in criticisms of the PTMF. So too has 
the claim that, because some medical diag-
noses, such as migraine or fibromyalgia, are 
not based on known biological patterns, then 
psychiatric categories are as valid as those in 
general medicine. All of these claims depend 
on ignoring or overlooking the fundamental 
problem that has led to the current state of 
crisis; in other words, framing psychological 
and emotional distress and many forms of 
troubling behaviour in medical terms.
This reluctance to talk about the ideas 
and assumptions underlying psychiatric diag-
nostic systems is very much encouraged by 
the systems’ interdependence with versions 
of positivism. It’s not surprising then, that 
some criticism of the framework is couched 
partly or more or less entirely in the language 
and requirements of positivism, at least as 
interpreted by modern psychology. This is 
illustrated in the words of one critic who 
described positivism as ‘the gathering and 
synthesis of evidence’, as if this process were 
a straightforward and neutral undertaking. 
It  is exactly this view that the PTMF chal-
lenges; it arises partly from psychology’s and 
psychiatry’s reluctance to acknowledge posi-
tivism as a philosophy rather than a set of 
self-evident rules for discovering facts about 
the world.
If this is the unexamined starting point, 
it is much more difficult to consider or even 
notice some key prior assumptions under-
lying diagnostic systems; for example, that 
the methods and frameworks of the phys-
ical and medical sciences, and metaphors 
derived from them, are appropriate for stud-
ying people’s thoughts feelings and actions, 
or that these are characterised by features 
and processes (including ‘mental disorders’) 
that can be objectively described in universal 
causal terms across time and place. It also 
makes it more difficult to consider ques-
tions about what constitutes evidence, how it 
should be presented and what it means about 
the privileging of certain kinds of quantifi-
cation and measurement, the possibility of 
separating facts from values and ‘self’ from 
others and the external world, and so on. In 
the main framework document, we discuss 
these issues and their implications in detail. 
These two areas of relative silence – 
about assumptions underlying diagnostic 
systems and positivism more generally – are 
reflected in some of the comments on our 
suggested provisional patterns. To claim they 
are just like diagnostic clusters, or labels for 
people, or that they appear to correspond to 
syndromes, shows a failure to move beyond 
the diagnostic lens. In fact, we discuss in 
detail the fundamental differences between 
our regularities in distress and diagnostic 
clusters, and the very different ideas about 
causality that inform them. 
Asking people to let go of the hope of 
finding medical-type patterns in distress 
organised by biology or ‘psychopathology’, 
and suggesting instead patterns organised by 
meaning, necessitates abandoning the false 
hope of finding discrete, universal causal path-
ways which are a precise fit for any individual, 
and which are stable across time and cultures. 
It means moving from clusters based on what 
people supposedly have or are, towards clus-
ters based on what they do and experience 
in particular contexts. It means abandoning 
medical terms such as ‘symptoms’, ‘disor-
ders’, ‘comorbidity’, ‘dual diagnosis’ and 
even ‘transdiagnostic’. This is a considerable 
conceptual leap, but we argue that it reflects 
and allows for the indefinite complexity of 
human agentic, meaning-based responses to 
their changing circumstances.
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Is the framework meant to replace  
all current practice?
We have emphasised that the framework is not 
intended as a wholesale replacement for current 
practice. Some current approaches are directly 
compatible with PTMF principles and we give 
a number of examples. We have also suggested 
ways in which the framework might enlarge 
and enhance existing practice, providing new 
ideas and encouraging a less individualistic 
focus. However, we disagree that diagnosis has 
been necessary for progress in psychological 
understanding and interventions, or that it 
is needed in order to identify the ‘correct 
treatment’. It is difficult to see how it could 
be, given persistent problems with validity and 
the very large amount of overlap across cate-
gories and heterogeneity within them. In fact, 
it may well be a limiting factor, distracting 
attention from this variability and what it might 
mean. There has been undoubted progress; 
for example, in understanding and alleviating 
problems such as panic, distressing rituals, low 
mood, post-traumatic distress, problems with 
alcohol and drugs to name a few. However, 
matching therapeutic strategies to particular 
problems rather than hypothesised disorders 
can be done just as well without diagnostic 
language and assumptions. This can also free 
us up to develop different kinds of under-
standings; for example, about the relationship 
between social contexts and people’s difficulties 
or about the relationships amongst difficul-
ties which cross diagnostic boundaries. In fact, 
taking the example of hearing voices, there 
has arguably been more recent progress from 
a non-diagnostic approach than from the last 
50 years of diagnostic-based research. In the 
main document, we discuss many reasons why 
diagnosis persists, including the expectation, 
or demand, that it is used to define research 
participants or assess interventions. All of this 
can give an impression of necessity, which 
is not justified by the evidence.
Is the framework all about formulation?
Contrary to suggestions that the PTMF 
is  promoting formulation as a particular 
psychological skill, it occupies a very small 
part of the documents. The concept and term 
‘narrative’ was purposely chosen in order to be 
inclusive of story-telling as a universal human 
capacity and ‘the almost infinite number of 
examples of narrative and dialogical practices 
across the globe’ (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018b, 
p.74). It is not obvious how this argument 
can be seen as a bid for professional (of any 
brand) dominance. Narratives can be of many 
kinds – including medical ones – but people 
can only choose from ones that are cultur-
ally available to them. As with previous DCP/
BPS documents, our aim is to expand this 
choice by moving beyond narrow psychiatric 
or indeed psychological ones.
Some people have made the point that 
not everyone wishes to tell, or can tell, a 
‘story.’ That is certainly true. Our argument – 
which applies to formulations as well as narra-
tives in  a more general sense – is that there 
is a crucial difference between a system based 
on diagnosis, and one based on the assump-
tion that people’s experiences and expres-
sions of distress arise out of reasons, functions 
and meanings, all of which are deeply rooted 
in their relational and social environments. 
Making sense of this, sometimes alongside 
a validating witness who may or may not be 
a professional, can be profoundly healing, and 
the General Patterns are intended to support 
this process. But while we argue for opportu-
nities to do this, that choice is always an indi-
vidual one. There is no proposed requirement 
for anyone to ‘produce a personal story’.
Is the framework all about trauma?
The framework has been widely described 
as focusing on trauma. This is seen both 
positively (it encourages us to attend to 
what has happened to people) and nega-
tively (it’s ‘just about trauma’ – what about 
people who haven’t experienced specific 
trauma?). We certainly do focus on the poten-
tial impact of many experiences which are 
generally described as ‘trauma’ (although 
our preferred word is ‘adversity’ because of 
its inclusivity), including sexual abuse and 
assault, childhood physical abuse, domestic 
violence and bullying. And we note that 
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the approach of many ‘trauma-informed 
services’ is compatible with many aspects 
of the framework. But we also note reser-
vations about the term ‘trauma’, about its 
medical overtones and potential to create 
a misleading impression of discrete, possibly 
very unusual, extreme or life-threatening 
events impinging from outside rather than of 
continuous or repeated very negative experi-
ences, embedded in  people’s lives and rela-
tionships. We have tried to show how these 
often everyday features of our lives, which 
may be taken as normal, can create and 
maintain many forms of distress or troubling 
behaviour, even when more obvious forms 
of ‘trauma’ are not evident. In fact, eluci-
dating the meaning of distress or troubling 
behaviour in such contexts – often relating to 
social norms and expectations – is a strength 
of the PTMF. Some of these expressions of 
distress will attract diagnostic labels, others 
will not. In line with this, we stress that the 
provisional patterns represent continua and 
can be relevant to people who have never had 
contact with mental health services or who 
have not had experiences they would describe 
as ‘trauma’.
Is the framework evidence based?
We discuss a great deal of evidence in rela-
tion to our arguments, drawn from many 
different sources. We point to the value of 
some positivist-based research and draw on 
it in our analysis, but without necessarily 
accepting unspoken assumptions about 
diagnostic categories, the meaning of meas-
urement scales, and so on. Questioning posi-
tivism’s underlying assumptions is not the 
same as rejecting empirical research. However, 
we do draw on research across disciplinary, 
methodological and epistemological bounda-
ries, including forms of evidence which have 
traditionally been marginalised, such as histor-
ical analyses and survivor and other personal 
accounts. This flexibility has puzzled some 
and been welcomed by others. We agree that 
we have not produced a new epistemology; 
this was not our intention. We hope that 
discussion of the large amount of evidence 
we have presented in support of the frame-
work and patterns will develop as the frame-
work is applied in different settings and as 
non-medicalised, non-diagnostic alternatives 
become more available. 
‘Race’, culture and ethnicity
We were grateful to our Critical Reader Group 
for their detailed comments on these issues. 
This large and complex area is considered 
in depth in chapters  2  (‘Philosophical and 
conceptual principles’), 3  (‘Meaning and 
narratives’) and  4  (‘The social context’) of 
the main document. In any future editions of 
the document we will be pleased to expand 
this with additional references to key figures 
from non-Western psychologies, as suggested 
in some of the feedback since publication. 
The very sensitive area of race and ‘culture’ 
has attracted critical responses, both in rela-
tion to the document content itself, and 
in  relation to the process of developing it. 
There are learning points in both areas. 
It may need re-emphasising that the 
General Patterns provisionally outlined 
in this version of the framework are appli-
cable mainly within Western or Westernised 
contexts. This follows from our core conten-
tion that patterns of distress are organised 
by meanings at personal, social and cultural 
levels: ‘Since patterns in emotional distress will 
always be to an extent local to time and place, 
there can never be a universal lexicon’ (John-
stone & Boyle, 2018b, p.11). While the total 
group of authors and contributors was drawn 
from a range of backgrounds and ethnicities, 
it is a majority white group, with all of us living 
in a society dominated by certain Western 
cultural values, including those of diagnostic 
models. Since, as we have shown, expressions 
of distress necessarily reflect their particular 
cultural context, the General Patterns that 
we have developed will inevitably do so too. 
It would not have been appropriate to do 
or to claim otherwise. At the same time, we 
have argued that some of the very basic prin-
ciples of PTMF are relevant across cultures 
– those to do with core human needs, evolved 
biologically-based responses and capacity for 
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meaning-making. Versions with better local fit 
(if it was felt they might be useful) would need 
to be developed by the social or cultural group 
in question. 
Whether or not these developments 
happen, the framework conveys a message of 
respect for different ways people express and 
try to heal their distress both within the UK 
and across the globe. There is no suggestion 
that PTMF needs exporting along the lines of 
the global mental health movement. However, 
we have been pleased at the welcome it has 
received from some workers with indigenous 
peoples, who see it as validating their use of 
culturally-appropriate perspectives and prac-
tices. We were also pleased to be invited to 
contribute a blog about the PTMF by the 
#WhatWENeed campaign, as part of a challenge 
to the globalisation of diagnostic models 
(www.tciasiapacific.blogspot.com/2018/10/
beyond-medicalisation-of-distress-new.html). 
Two of the authors are undertaking a tour of 
New Zealand and Australia, where it is hoped 
to present the framework alongside indige-
nous understandings of distress. We anticipate 
that this will result in a rich dialogue, with 
implications for further development of our 
conceptual resource. 
The welfare/benefits aspect
Service users have inevitably been alarmed by 
reports such as that psychologists will hence-
forth be refusing to endorse claims based on 
diagnostic categories due to roll-out of the 
PTMF. Our actual position is ‘In the short and 
medium term, psychiatric diagnoses will still 
be required for people to access services, bene-
fits and so on. These rights must be protected’ 
(Johnstone & Boyle, 2018a, p.18). However, 
while acceptable to some, other service users 
deeply resent the need to take on a diagnostic 
label in order to obtain essential resources or 
services (Beresford et al., 2016), and diagnosis 
often fails to secure this outcome anyway. 
Chapter 8 of the main document outlines 
the pros and cons of a range of welfare 
system alternatives, starting with creative 
use of the existing system and leading up 
to more radical ideas such as universal basic 
income. We  acknowledge that patterns and 
personal narratives would not be suitable to 
such a purpose – nowhere have we suggested 
that people should be required to produce 
a ‘trauma story’ in order to qualify. One possi-
bility is that ‘for specific purposes, non-medical 
problem descriptions such as ‘hearing hostile 
voices’ or ‘suspicious thoughts’ or… ‘feeling 
suicidal’ or ‘self-harming’ could be appro-
priate substitutes for diagnostic language 
(Johnstone & Boyle, 2018a, p.315), compat-
ible with and helpful for welfare and other 
statutory purposes. 
None of these ideas is presented as 
a recommendation or easy solution, and all 
are recognised as having limitations as well 
as advantages. We recognise the argument 
that dropping diagnostic categories could 
be used to promote a neoliberal agenda of 
withdrawing support; but it is also true that 
diagnostic labels have not prevented the 
current dire situation in which welfare recipi-
ents have been driven to destitution and even 
suicide (www.theguardian.com/society/2018/
nov/16/uk-austerity-has-inflicted-great-misery- 
on-citizens-un-says). For all these reasons, the 
PTMF aims to start an important and neces-
sary discussion about ways in which the bene-
fits system might start to move away from 
diagnostic assumptions.
Service user involvement in the project 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to outline a major new conceptual 
framework that is co-produced with service 
users, both as members of the core team and 
as consultants to the project. They collec-
tively represented a range of class, gender 
and ethnic backgrounds and diagnostic attri-
butions. A number of other contributors 
also had service user experience (but did 
not choose to state this in every case). The 
project itself draws extensively on service 
user/survivor testimony and literature as part 
of its challenge to traditional notions of what 
counts as ‘evidence’.
While no process is perfect, we believe 
that criticisms about ‘only X number of survi-
vors were consulted about changing the entire 
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system’ are based on a misunderstanding. 
As previously stated, the PTMF is not formal 
policy or a plan for services. Any such plan – 
which at present is only hypothetical – would 
obviously need, in keeping with the principles 
of the framework itself, the involvement of 
a much larger group of stakeholders, with 
service users and carers taking a central part. 
The framework is not just about profes-
sional services, and it was our hope that 
some user groups might take on this perspec-
tive themselves, quite separately from the 
mental health system. We are delighted that 
several peer groups have done so and found 
it helpful. There have also been many posi-





01/12/power-threat-meaning). Other service 
users clearly feel differently, as is their right.
Professional power
We discuss the operation of power in relation 
to psychology and psychiatry, particularly in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 8 of the main publication. 
This tends to focus on ideological power in rela-
tion to the production of theory, research and 
cultural narratives of distress, and legal power 
in relation to mental health legislation. On 
reflection, we think we should have addressed 
the issue of power in relation to professional 
practice – especially the power of clinical 
psychologists, who make up the majority of 
the core group – more directly. Partly to avoid 
a predictable scrap about ‘This is psychologists 
trying to replace psychiatrists as top profes-
sion’, we decided not to discuss any specific 
profession in favour of more general points 
about power in relation to both psychology 
and psychiatry as disciplines and producers 
of ‘knowledge’. Power as applied to clinical 
psychology is implicitly critiqued at many 
points, and specifically through critical consid-
eration of practices traditionally associated 
with it, such as formulation and the national 
roll-out of some psychological therapies. We 
were perhaps too reticent about discussing 
the serious implications for all mental health 
professions of moving away from a medicalised, 
diagnostic practice. We agree with the blogger 
who wrote: ‘…one of my thoughts as a nurse is 
this framework does not give us an allegiance 
problem – that is, whether to carry on largely 
supporting the psychiatrist and their manuals 
or switch to the psychologist and this new 
framework – since all three professions (and 




framework/#more-1364). However, we accept 
that this still leaves a gap that needs filling in 
any future edition. 
Social media responses
Some readers will be aware that social media 
reactions have been mixed. It is hard to know 
how representative they are, given the tendency 
of online forums to amplify certain voices 
and views. Accusations of being both Marxist 
and alt-right, or of promoting both neoliberal 
and Scientology agendas have been intriguing. 
However, the very personal and often sexist 
attacks by some professionals, along with alle-
gations about silencing discussion, obstructing 
the consultation process and so on, have been 
disappointing to say the least. We have also 
been sad to see some survivors dismissing 
others who contributed to the project (about 
15 in all, including the consultation group) 
as unrepresentative – perhaps not dissimilar 
to the kind of discounting that professionals 
have often been guilty of in relation to survivor 
views. Controversies that touch on both ideo-
logical interests and personal identities will 
inevitably be uncomfortable, and yet given the 
power and reach of diagnostic models, these 
are discussions we must have.
Looking to the future 
We are pleased that the PTMF is being used 
to validate and support existing good work, 
as well as suggest new ways forward. We hope 
the planned PTMF working party reporting to 
the DCP Executive Committee will be able to 
support the following: 
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 ■ Ensuring wide stakeholder involvement 
in further developments, especially with 
service users, with people from different 
cultural and ethnic contexts, and with 
professionals of all backgrounds. 
 ■ Producing accessible versions suitable for 
particular groups (service users, people 
with learning disabilities, children, the 
general public and so on).
 ■ More work on practical alternatives to diag-
nostic terminology in the area of benefits, 
the law, and other statutory agencies.
 ■ A research agenda aimed at further devel-
oping and validating the General Patterns 
and their evidence base.
 ■ Evaluation of other aspects of the PTMF 
in practice using a range of methodologies 
as suggested in our section on research 
(Johnstone & Boyle, 2018a, pp.308–313).
 ■ Encouraging research based on or using 
the PTMF.
 ■ Linking with groups who may wish to 
develop the PTMF, in line with their own 
cultural beliefs and contexts.
 ■ Linking with journalists, policy makers, 
campaigners, and other key players and 
organisations in the mental health field.
Final reflections 
While we have at no point claimed to have 
produced a ‘paradigm shift’, we do feel that 
widespread interest in PTMF is a sign that 
people are actively looking for alternatives. 
As the articles in this issue show, people 
from a range of professional and service user 
contexts are taking on the PTMF ideas and 
adapting them for their own purposes, exactly 
as we had hoped. The level of attention paid 
to this lengthy and detailed academic discus-
sion document can be taken as a sign of the 
challenge it presents in a number of highly 
sensitive areas, from ideological interests and 
professional status, to personal identities. 
While this debate is not easy, and there are no 
simple solutions, we believe it is essential that 
it happens, and are pleased to have contrib-
uted to this process.
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